People v. Griffin by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
4-25-1967
People v. Griffin
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Griffin 66 Cal.2d 459 (1967).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/666
) 
[Crim. No.1030S. In Bank. Apr. 25, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDW ARD 
DEAN GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury Unable 
to Agree.-On retrial of a murder case, the stipulated fact 
that the jury foreman in the prior trial disclosed in open court 
that the jurors, when discharged, stood 10 for acquittal and 2 
for second degree murder did not establish implied acquittal of 
first degree murder. It may not be inferred from the foreman's 
statement that the jurors unanimously agl'eed to acquit of first 
degree murder; nor need acquittal be implied as a matter of 
policy; and since defendant had not been convicted of a lesser 
offense overturned on 'appeal, there was no need to prohibit 
retrial for any greater crime to protect the right to appeal. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes-E1feet of Aequittal.-Compe-
tent and otherwise admissible evidence of another crime is not 
made inadmissible by defendant's acquittal of that crime. 
[8] Jlomieide-Evidence-Subsequent Conduct: Other Crimes.-In 
a murder case, evidence of a rape, of which defendant was 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 135 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 
§ 320 et seq. 
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 136; [2, 4] Criminal 
Law, §402; [3] Homicide, §§72, 101; [5] Criminal Law, §390(1); 
[6] Criminal Law, § 13S3; Homicide, § 266; [7] Witnesses, 
1241. 
) 
) 
460 PEOPLE V. GRIFFIN [66 C.2d 
acquitted, was relevant though the alleged rape occurred after 
the murder where in both instances defendant became 
acquainted with a man living with a common law wife, used 
that acquaintance to be invited to the man's home for the 
night or longer, and then attacked the woman in the man's 
absence; however, the court erred in excluding evidence that 
defendant was acquitted of the rape. 
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence--Other Crimes-E1fect of Acquittal. 
-A properly authenticated acquittal is admissible to rebut 
prosecution evidence of defendant's guilt of a crime other than 
the one charged. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Regardless of the probative 
value of evidence of other crimes, the admission of such evi-
dence involves the risk of serious prejudice and is always to be 
received with extreme caution. 
[6] Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Exclusion of Evidence: 
Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Exclusion of Evidence. 
-In a murder case, where proof of an intent to rape was 
crucial to the prosecution's felony-murder theory and proof of 
defendant's rape in Mexico after the murder was crucial in 
proving an intent to rape, it was reasonably probable a result 
more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the 
jury been allowed to consider his acquittal of the rape in 
Mexico, and exclusion of evidence of that acquitt'al was preju-
dicialerror resulting in a miscarriage of justice and requiring 
reversal. (Const., art. VI, § 13.) 
[7] Witnesses-Impeachment and Contradiction-Collateral Mat-
ter Adduced on Cross-examination.-In a murder case, where a 
witness on cross-examination by defendant denied telling 
investigating officers of an arrangement whereby defendant 
was to sleep with the victim in return for money paid to the 
witness, defendant's offer of proof, to impeach this statement, 
by an officer's testimony that he had been told by the witness 
that his buddies had told him of such an arrangement with 
defendant was not inconsistent with the witness' testimony on 
cross-examination, and the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing the offer of proof. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty reversed. 
Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender, Charles A. Maple and 
James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defend-
ant and Appellant. 
) 
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Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and James H. Kline, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaiutiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant was sentenced to death for 
the murder of Essie Mae Hodson. This appeal is automatic. 
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
There have been three trials. In the first, defendant was 
found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. 
On automatic appeal we affirmed the jUdgment. (People v. 
Griffin, 60 Ca1.2d 182 [32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432J.) The 
United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the 
prosecutor's comments and the trial court's instructions to 
. the jury concerning defendant's failure to take the stand and 
testify violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applica-
ble to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489]. (Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 8.Ct. 1229].) 
In the second trial the jury was discharged and a mistrial 
declared when the jury failed to reach a verdict. Based on 
this fact, defendant moved to enter a plea of once in jeopardy 
to the charge of first degree murder. The motion was denied, 
the case proceeded to the third trial, and the jury found 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and fixed the punish-
ment at death. 
The evidence disclosed the following events. 
On December 2, 1961, Eddie Seay and a friend he knew as 
Al met defendant on a Los Angeles sidewalk. Defendant 
asked them for directions to the 41st Street Club, a beer and 
wine bar in the neighborhood. He also asked the two men 
where they were going and, learning that they were on their 
way to buy a bottle of wine, gave them a quarter toward the 
price. The group then parted, defendant presumably heading 
for the 41st Street Club. 
Seay and Al bought and drank the wine and about 9 p.m. 
entered the 41st Street Club. Essie Mae Hodson, who had been 
living with Seay for about three years, was sitting at a booth 
with two friends. Seay and Al joined the group at the booth, 
and defendant, who had been standing at the bar, also joined 
them at Seay's invitation. They talked and drank wine and 
beer purchased by defendant. During the evening Al and 
Essie Mae's friends left the booth, and between midnight and 
1 a.m. Essie May went home to' bed. Defendant and Seay 
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stayed at the bar drinking coffee until about 2 a.m. Because it 
was late, defendant asked Seay if he could spend the night in 
the apartment shared by Seay and Essie May. Seay agreed, 
and the two men left the bar together. 
Seay and Essie Mae lived in an upstairs apartment of a 
four-unit building. Essie Mae was asleep in the bedroom when 
Seay and defendant arrived. Seay prepared a daybed in the 
living room for defendant and then went to bed with Essie 
Mae. He was awakened later by a noise in the living room. He 
got out of bed and saw defendant and Essie Mae struggling----
on the daybed. Essie Mae told Seay that defendant had put 
his hand over her mouth and tried to force her to have sexual 
relations with him. Seay suggested to defendant that they go 
out for coffee and took him down the back stairs. At the 
bottom of the stairs Seay told defendant to wait for a minute. 
He then left defendant, returned to the apartment by another 
stairway, and went back to bed with Essie Mae. 
A few minutes later Seay heard knocking at the back door 
and defendant calling to be let in. He then heard glass break-
ing, got out of bed, put on his pants, and went back toward 
the door. He found defendant standing in the living room. 
Again. S~ay suggested that they go out for coffee, and again 
the two men went down the back stairs. Defendant at the time 
was making "muaning" sounds and kept repeating that he 
wanted to return to the apartment. When they reached the 
bottom of the stairs, defendant hit Seay twice, knocking him 
to the ground. Seay got up and ran to the 41st Street Club for 
help, There 'he found a man called Piggy-bank who agreed to 
return to the apartment with him. When they arrived defend-
ant and Essie Mae were gone. Seay never saw her alive 
again. 
About 7 on the morning of December 3 Alfredo Villasenor 
went to an alley about 300 feet from Essie Mae's apartment 
to look for scrap wood. In the alley was a very large trash box 
used for sawdust and scrap. Villasenor saw defendant coming 
out of the box buttoning up his pants and asked him what he 
was doing. Defendant replied, "Nothing," and walked away. 
Villasenor looked into the trash box and saw Essie Mae. She 
was trembling and appeared to have been beaten. 
The police were called. When they arrived, the officers 
found Essie Mae seated at the front of the trash box. She was 
dressed only in a long robe that was wet and dirty. She was 
shivering, bleeding from the head, had scratches on the backs 
of her hands, and appeared to be in shock. Her responses to 
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questions were largely incoherent, and the police were able to 
learn nothing more than her name. The trash box was blood-
stained; in the box was the wig that Essie Mae always wore. 
Essie Mae was taken to a hospital where she died the next 
day. An autopsy revealed two large abrasions on her head, 
indicating that she either had been struck with or had fallen 
against a solid object at least twice. There were multiple abra-
sions and scratches on her face, chest, ankles, and on the backs 
of her hands. There were no bruises, tears, or other indica-
tions of forcible rape in the vicinity of the thighs or external 
genitalia, nor was there evidence of sperm. According to the 
pathologist who performed the autopsy, however, there would 
normally be no sperm present 24 or at most 48 hours after 
intercourse. The pathologist further testified that, judging 
from the nature of her injuries, it was unlikely that Essie 
Mae would have voluntarily participated in sexual intercourse 
or that she would have been able to resist sexual attack. 
Further, he felt that with her injuries she probably would 
have been unable to walk the 300 feet from the apartment 
stairway to the trash box without assistance. 
After the attack on Essie Mae, defendant went to Mexicali, 
Mexico. There, in mid-December, he met Willie Kerr, who was 
living with Amanda Encinas. Kerr knew defendant as Willie 
Lee Fairchild. Defendant obtained work at a cotton mill in EI 
Centro, California, where Kerr also worked. Kerr agreed to 
allow defendant to stay at his home in MexicalL 
On December 16, before Kerr went to work, he told Amanda 
that defendant would be coming to stay with them and 
instructed her to make defendant's breakfast when he came. 
When defendant arrived, he motioned to Amanda, who spoke 
only Spanish, that he wanted a towel. She testified that when 
she took the towel to defendant, he grabbed her, pushed her 
out of the kitchen and into another room, began to beat her, 
forced her to disro~e, threw her on the bed, and attempted to 
have intercourse with her. Amanda testified through an inter-
preter t.hat during the attempt defendant said he would kill 
her in five minutes. Kerr returned home from work about 
noon. He found Amanda in her slip and defendant in the 
process of putting on his trousers. Kerr pushed Amanda and 
threatened defendant. The police, who had probably been 
called by neighbors, arrived and took Amanda, Kerr, and 
defendant to jail. Defendant was charged with rape, tried, 
and acquitted. He was subsequently arrested in Mexicali for' 
the murder of Essie Mae. 
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[1] We first consider defendant's contention that his 
third trial placed him twice in jeopardy of first degree 
murder. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1023.) The 
jury at the second trial was discharged after failing to reach 
a unanimo,!s verdict, and a mistrial was declared. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1140, 1141.) After the jury was discharged, the foreman 
disclosed in open court that the jurors had stood 10 for 
acquittal and 2 for guilty of second degree murder. The trial 
court refused to make this information a matter of record, but 
the prosecution and defendant stipulated to the fact before 
the beginning of the third trial. Defendant contends that this 
fact establishes an implied acquittal of first degree murder. 
This contention must be rejected. Defendant does not deny 
that the jury was properly discharged pursuant to Penal 
Code section 1140. (Compare Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 
Ca1.2d 1; 5 [22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641].) We may not 
infer from the foreman's statement that the jury had unani-
mously agreed to acquit of first degree murder. There is no---
reliable basis in fact for such an implication, for the jurors 
had not completed their deliberations and those voting for 
second degree murder may have been temporarily compromis-
ing in an effort to reach unanimity. Nor need we "imply" an 
acquittal as a matter of policy. Defendant has not had a 
conviction of a lesser offense overturned on appeal, and it is 
therefore not necessary to prohibit retrial for any greater 
crime to protect the right to appeal. (Compare Green v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 184 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 78 8.Ct. 221, 61 
A.L.R.2d 1119] ; Gomez v. Superim' Court, 50 Cal.2d 640 [328 
P.2d 976] ; People v. Henderson, 60 Ca1.2d 482 [35 Cal.Rptr. 
77,386 P.2d 677].) 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
the evidence of the subsequent attack on Amanda in Mexico, 
on the ground that he was acquitted of that crime. [2] It 
is settled, however, that competent and otherwise admissible 
evidence of another crime is not made inadmissible by reason 
of the defendant's acquittal of that crime. (People v. Griffin. 
60 Ca1.2d 182, 191 [32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432J.; People v. 
Frank, 28 Cal. 507; People v. Fox, 126 Cal.App.2d 560 r272 
P.2d 832] ; People v. Lewis, 105 Cal.App.2d 208 [233 P.2d 
30] ; People v. Follette, 74 Ca1.App. 178 [240 P. 502] ; Note, 
86 A.L.R.2d 1132; see McBaine, Cal. Evidence Manual (2d ed. 
1960) § 637, p. 220.) 
[3] In the present case the evidt:>ncp of the subsequent 
crime was admissible because the similarities between the 
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crimes made evidence of the later crime relevant to prove that 
Essie Mae's injuries were not accidental but inflicted by 
defendant and to prove that he intended to rape her. The 
evidence tended to prove that in both instances defendant 
became acquainted with a man living with a common law 
wife, used that acquaintance to be invited to the man's home 
for the night or longer, and then attacked the woman in the 
. man's absence. Under these circumstances, the evidence of the 
other crime is relevant even though it occurred after instead 
of before the crime charged, and the chronology of the crimes 
does not therefore aiIect the admissibility of the evidence of 
the subsequent crime. (People v. Ooe/ield, 37 Cal.2d 865, 870 
[236 P.2d 570] ; People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 561 [229 
P.341].) 
The trial court erred, however, in excluding evidence on the 
issue of guilt thnt defendant was acquitted of the subsequent 
crime by a Mexican court. Although there is authority to the 
contrary (Note, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1135, 1145-46), the better 
rule allows proof of an acquittal to weaken and rebut the 
prosecution's evidence of the other crime. (People v. Frank, 
28 Cal. 5W, 515; People v. Lancaster, 148 Cal.App.2d 187, 194 
1306 P.2d' 626] ; People v. Fox, 126 Cal.App.2d 560, 569 [272 
P.2d 832] ; People v. Follette, 74 Cal.App. 178, 212 [240 P. 
502] ; Pilcher v. United States (5th Cir. 1902) 113 F. 248, 249 
[51 C.C.A. 205] ; Note, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1144-45.) 
The Attorney General contends that evidence of acquittal 
of another crime should not be admissible to prove that a 
defendant was not guilty of that crime, on the ground that 
the acquittal is only the hearsay opinion of another factfinder 
based on evidence presented at- another time and place. The 
same objection could be made to the use of many other official 
records as admissible hearsay, and, accordingly, it would be 
anomalous to treat judgments differently from other properly 
authenticated official documents when they are offered, not as 
res judicata, but tor their evidentiary value alone. (See 
McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 295, pp. 618-19; 5 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1671a, pp. 688-89.)1 [4] What-
ever merit there may be to denying judgments evidentiary 
lWigmore has suggested that the exclusion of judgments under many 
circumstances has been due to a failure to distinguish between treating 
them as conclusive proof of facts stated and treating them merely as 
admissible evidence of those facts, subject to rebuttal. (See 5 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1671a, p. 688. See also id. at p. 694; 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1346a, p. 671.) 
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value in other contexts,2 we are convinced that we should not 
depart from the rule that a properly authenticated acquittal 
is admissible to rebut prosecution evidence of guilt of another 
crIme. 
[5] Regardless of its probative value, evidence of ether 
crimes always involves the risk of serious prejudice, and it is 
therefore always "to be received with 'extreme caution.' " 
(People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7].) 
Indeed, for this very reason some courts have concluded that 
an acquittal so attenuates the weight that may properly be 
given evidence of another crime as to require the exclusion of 
such evidence altogether. (See People v. Ulrich, 30 Il1.2d 94, 
101 [195 N.E.2d 180] ; State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307 [350 
P.2d 756, 86 A.L.R.2d 1120].) Our rule does not go that far, 
but instead is fair to both the prosecution and the defense by 
assisting the jury in its assessment of the significance of the 
evidence of "another crime with the knowledge that at another 
time and place a duly constituted tribunal charged with the 
very issue of determining defendant's guilt or innocence of 
the other crime concluded that he was not guilty. S 
[6] The error in excluding the evidence of the Mexican 
acquittal was prejudicial. The admission of the evidence of 
the Mexica,n crime may' well have spelled the difference 
between a jury divided 10 for acquittal to 2 for conviction of 
second degree murder and a jury unanimous for first degree 
murder. Proof of an intent to rape was crucial to the prosecu .. 
tion's felony murder theory, and proof of the Mexican crime 
was crucial in proving an intent to rape. Had the jury been 
allowed to consider the determination of the Mexican tribu-
nal, its consideration of the evidence of that crime would have 
been materially affected. We therefore conclude that in the 
absence of the error it is reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to defendant would have been reached. 
Accordingly, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, 
2It is noteworthy that under the new Evidence Code judgments of 
felony conviction are made admissible evidence under certain circum-
stances. (Evid. Code, § 1300.) 
3The Mexican judgment stated that any injuries to Amanda Encinas 
were caused by Willie Kerr, her common law husband, and that any 
sexual relations between defendant and Amanda were not the result of 
physical or moral violence or force. Amanda had complained that she 
had been forcibly raped; defendant declared that she had offered to have 
intercourse for nve dollars. 
Because of the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, evidence of an acquittal is not, of course, as convincing of inno-
cence as a judgment of conviction is convincing of guilt; but this fact 
goes to the weight not the admissibility of the evidence. 
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and the judgment must be reversed. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13;· People v. lVatson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
[7] We discuss one further issue because the question is 
likely to arise again at a new trial. On cross-examination by 
defendant, Eddie Seay denied that he had ever told investi-
gating officers of an arrangement whereby defendant was to 
sleep with Essie Mae in return for a payment of money to 
Seay. In an offer of proof, defendant wished to impeach this 
statement by an officer's testimony to the effect that he had 
been told by Seay that Seay's buddies had told Seay that he 
had made such an arrangement with defendant. Seay had not 
been asked on cross-examination if he had told the investigat-
ing officers of the information given him by his friends, and 
the notes of the investigating officer state that Seay denied 
ever making any such arrangement, although he admitted that 
he was intoxicated at the relevant time. The statement offered 
by defendant was not inconsistent with Seay's testimony that 
he had never told the officers that he had made the arrange-
ment with defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing the evidence. (See Western Union Oil 00. v. 
Newlove, 145 Cal. 772, 775-776 [79 P. 542].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
'Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Sullivan, J., and White, J.,t con-
curred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. In my opinion it is not reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have 
been reached had the evidence of his acquittal of the Mexican 
crime been admitted at his trial on guilt. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13;· People v. Watson,46 Cal.2d 818,836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
Evidence of that acquittal was admitted at the penalty trial, 
and it is apparent that it had no effect upon the jury since the 
jury returned the death penalty. 
There is overwhelming evidence that defendant killed Essie 
Mae Hodson in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
rape. Evidence of the incident in Mexico several weeks later, 
indicating a similar plan, scheme and design was highly rele-
vant as to defendant's illicit motives in introducing himself 
into the household of an acquaintance. Whether in the Mexi-
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966. 
tRetired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
can incident he accomplished his objectives by means of rape 
by force or by inducement was relatively unimportant. It was 
the bearing which the Mexican incident had on his intentions 
which was significant. . 
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
